Asia are often thoroughly penetrated by informal patron-client networks that undermine the formal structure of authority. If we are to grasp why a bureaucrat's authority is likely to depend more on his personal following and extrabureaucratic connections than on his formal post, or why political parties seem more like ad hoc assemblages of notables together with their entourages than arenas in which established interests are aggregated, we must rely heavily on patron-client analysis. The dynamics of personal alliance networks are as crucial in the day-to-day realities of national institutions as in local politics; the main difference is simply that such networks are more elaborately disguised by formal facades in modern institutions.
In what follows, I attempt to clarify what patron-client ties are, how they affect political life, and how they may be applied to the dynamics of Southeast Asian politics. After 1) defining the nature of the patron-client link and distinguishing it from other social ties, the paper 2) discriminates among different varieties of patron-client bonds and thereby establishes some important dimensions of variation, and 3) examines both the survival of and the transformations in patron-client links in Southeast Asia since colonialism and the impact of major social changes (such as the growth of markets, the expanded role of the state, and so forth) on the content of these ties.
I. The Nature of Patron-Client Ties
The Basis and Operation of Personal Exchange. While the actual use of the terms "patron" and "client" is largely confined to the Mediterranean and Latin American areas, comparable relationships can be found in most cultures and are most strikingly present in preindustrial nations. The patron-client relationship-an exchange relationship between roles-may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron. In the reciprocity demanded by the relationship each partner provides a service that is valued by the other. Although the balance of benefits may heavily favor the patron, some reciprocity is involved, and it is this quality which, as Powell notes, distinguishes patron-client dyads from relationships of pure coercion or formal authority that also may link individuals of different status.5 A patron may have some coercive power and he may also hold an official position of authority. But if the force or authority at his command are alone sufficient to ensure the compliance of another, he has no need of patron-client ties which require some reciprocity. Typically, then, the patron operates in a context in which community norms and sanctions and the need for clients require at least a minimum of bargaining and reciprocity; the power imbalance is not so great as to permit a pure command relationship.
Three additional distinguishing features of patron-client links, implied by the definition, merit brief elaboration: their basis in inequality, their face-to-face character, and their diffuse flexibility. All three factors are most apparent in the ties between a high-status landlord and each of his tenants or sharecroppers in a traditional agrarian economy-a relationship that serves, in a sense, as the prototype of patron-client ties. 6 First, there is an imbalance in exchange between the two partners which expresses and reflects the disparity in their relative wealth, power, and status. A client, in this sense, is someone who has entered an unequal exchange relation in which he is unable to reciprocate fully. A debt of obligation binds him to the patron.7 How does this imbalance in reciprocity 6 Another comparable model, of course, is the lordvassal link of high feudalism, except in this relationship the mutual rights and obligations were of an almost formal, contractual nature. Most patron-client ties we will discuss involve tacit, even diffuse standards of reciprocity. Cf. Ruston Coulborn, ed., Feudalism in History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).
In most communities this sense of obligation is a strong moral force, backed by informal community sanctions that help bind the client to the patron. A good account of how such feelings of debt reinforce social bonds in the Philippines is Frank Lynch's description of utang nla loob in Four Readings in Philiparise? It is based, as Peter Blau has shown in his work, Exchange and Power in Social Life,8 on the fact that the patron often is in a position to supply unilaterally goods and services which the potential client and his family need for their survival and well being. A locally dominant landlord, for example, is frequently the major source of protection, of security, of employment, of access to arable land or to education, and of food in bad times. Such services could hardly be more vital, and hence the demand for them tends to be highly inelastic; that is, an increase in their effective cost will not diminish demand proportionately. Being a monopolist, or at least an oligopolist, for critical needs, the patron is in an ideal position to demand compliance from those who wish to share in these scarce commodities.
Faced with someone who can supply or deprive him of basic wants, the potential client in theory has just four alternatives to becoming the patron's subject.9 First he may reciprocate with a service that the patron needs badly enough to restore the balance of exchange. In special cases of religious, medical, or martial skills such reciprocation may be possible, but the resources of the client, given his position in the stratification, are normally inadequate to reestablish an equilibrium. A potential client may also try to secure the needed services elsewhere. If the need for clients is especially great, and if there is stiff competition among patron-suppliers, the cost of patron-controlled services will be less.10 In most agrarian settings, substantial local autonomy tends to favor the growth of local power monopolies by officials or landed gentry. A third possibility is that clients may coerce the patron into providing services. Although the eventuality that his clients might turn on him may prompt a patron to meet at least the minimum normative standards of exchange,11 the patron's local power and the ab- 9These general alternatives are deduced by Blau (p. 118) and are intended to be exhaustive. '0Later, we will examine certain conditions under which this may actually occur.
'"There is little doubt that this last resort usually acts as a brake on oppression. The proximate causes for many peasant uprisings in medieval Europe during hard times often involved revocation of small rights granted serfs by their lords-e.g., gleaning rights, use of the commons for pasturage, hunting and fishing privileges, reduction of dues in bad crop years -rights which offered a margin of security. Such re- Affiliating with a patron is neither a purely coerced decision nor is it the result of unrestricted choice. Exactly where a particular patron-client dyad falls on the continuum depends on the four factors mentioned. If the client has highly valued services to reciprocate with, if he can choose among competing patrons, if force is available to him, or if he can manage without the patron's help-then the balance will be more nearly equal. But if, as is generally the case, the client has few coercive or exchange resources to bring to bear against a monopolistpatron whose services he desperately needs, the dyad is more nearly a coercive one.12
The degree of compliance a client gives his patron is a direct function of the degree of imbalance in the exchange relationship-of how dependent the client is on his patron's services. An imbalance thus creates a sense of debt or obligation on the client's part so long as it meets his basic subsistence needs and represents, for the patron, a "'store of value'-social credit that . . . (the patron) can draw on to obtain advantages at a later time."'13 The patron's domination of needed services, enabling him to build up savings of deference and compliance which enhance his status, and represents a capacity for mobilizing a group of supporters when he cares to. The larger a patron's clientele and the more dependent on him they are, the greater his latent capacity to organize A second distinguishing feature of the patron-client dyad is the face-to-face, personal quality of the relationship. The continuing pattern of reciprocity that establishes and solidifies a patron-client bond often creates trust and affection between the partners. When a client needs a small loan or someone to intercede for him with the authorities, he knows he can rely on his patron; the patron knows, in turn, that "his men" will assist him in his designs when he needs them.'5 Furthermore, the mutual expectations of the partners are backed by community values and ritual.
In most contexts the affection and obligation invested in this tie between nonrelatives is expressed by the use of terms of address between partners that are normally reserved for close kin. The tradition of choosing godparents in Catholic nations is often used by a family to create a fictive kinship tie with a patron-the godfather thereby becoming like a brother to the parents.'6 Whether the model of obligation established is father-son, uncle-nephew, or elder-younger brother, the intention is similar: to establish as firm a bond of affection and loyalty as that between close relatives. Thus while a patron and client are very definitely alive to the instrumental benefits of their association, it is not simply a neutral link of mutual advantage. On the contrary, it is often a durable bond of genuine mutual devotion that can survive severe testing.
The face-to-face quality of the patron-client dyad, as well as the size of the patron's resource base, limits the number of direct active ties a single patron can have.'7 Even with vast resources, the personal contact and friendship built into the link make it highly unlikely that an active clientele could exceed, say, one hundred persons. The total following of a given patron may be much larger than this, but normally all except 20-30 clients would be linked to the patron through intermediaries. Since we are dealing with positive emotional ties (the ratio of "calculation" to affection may of course vary), a leader and his immediate entourage will be comparatively small.
The third distinctive quality of patron-client ties, one that reflects the affection involved, is that they are diffuse, "whole-person" relationships rather than explicit, impersonal-contract bonds. A landlord may, for example, have a client who is connected to him by tenancy, friendship, past exchanges of services, the past tie of the client's father to his father, and ritual coparenthood. Such a strong "multiplex" relation, as Adrian Mayer terms it,"' covers a wide range of potential exchanges. The patron may very well ask the client's help in preparing a wedding, in winning an election campaign, or in finding out what his local rivals are up to; the client may approach the patron for help in paying his son's tuition, in filling out government forms, or in getting food or medicine when he falls on bad times. The link, then, is a very flexible one in which the needs and resources of the partners, and hence the nature of the exchange, may vary widely over time. Unlike explicit contractual relations, the very diffuseness of the patron-client linkage contributes to its survival even during rapid social change-it tends to persist so long as the two partners have something to offer one another.'9 Just as two brothers may assist each other in a host of ways, patron-client partners have a relationship that may also be invoked for almost any purpose; the chief differences are the "8 Adrian C. Mayer, "The Significance of QuasiGroups in the Study of Complex Societies," in Michael Banton, ed., The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, pp. 97-122. Mayer would call a short-term, contractual interaction that was limited in scope a simplex tie.
19In another sense the patron-client dyad is fragile. Since it is a diffuse, noncontractual bond, each partner is continually on guard against the possibility that the other will make excessive demands on him, thus exploiting the friendship. A patron may, for example, prefer to hire an outsider for an important job because he can then contractually insist that the work be of top quality. With a client, it would be a delicate matter to criticize the work. The Distinctiveness of the Patron. The role of patron ought to be distinguished from such role designations as "broker," "middleman," or "boss" with which it is sometimes confounded. Acting as a "broker" or "middleman"-terms which I shall use interchangeably-means serving as an intermediary to arrange an exchange or transfer between two parties who are not in direct contact. The role of middleman, then, involves a three party exchange in which the middleman functions as an agent and does not himself control the thing transferred. A patron, by contrast, is part of a two-person exchange and operates with resources he himself owns or directly controls.20 Finally, the terms "middleman" and "broker" do not specify the relative status of the actor to others in the transaction, while a patron is by definition of superior rank to his client.
Important as this distinction is, it is easily lost sight of for two reasons. First, it is not always a simple task to determine if someone personally controls the resources he uses to advance himself. What of the case in which a civil servant distributed the subordinate posts in his jurisdiction to create an entourage? Here it would seem that he was acting as a patron, inasmuch as the jobs he gave out were meant as personal gifts from the store of scarce values he controlled and were intended to create a feeling of personal debt and obligation among recipients. The social assessment of the nature of the gift is thus crucial. If we were to find, on the other hand, that the civil servant was viewed as someone who had acted as an agent of jobseekers and put them in touch with a politician who controlled the jobs, then he would be acting as a broker. It is only natural that many an ambitious public official will seek to misrepresent acts of brokerage or simple adherence to the rules as personal acts of patronage, thereby building his following.21 To the extent that he 20 A broker does, in a real sense have a resource: namely, connections. That is, the broker's power-his capacity to help people-is predicated on his ties with third parties. 21 U.S. Congressmen spend a good portion of their time trying to seize personal credit for decisions which benefit their constituents whether or not they had anything to do with the decision-as broker or patron. For similar reasons, cabinet ministers in Malaysia and elsewhere have travelled about the country with government checks in hand, making grants to mosques, temples, and charitable groups in a way that will dramatize the largesse as an act of personal patronage. Every government decision that benefits someone represents an opportunity for someone to use that act to enlarge the circle of those personally obligated to him.
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Vol. 66 succeeds in representing his act as a personal act of generosity, he will call forth that sense of personal obligation that will bind his subordinates to him as clients.22 A second potential source of confusion in this distinction is that the terms designate roles and not persons, and thus it is quite possible for a simle individual to act both as a broker and a patron. Such a role combination i not only possible, but is empirically quite common. When a local landowning patron, for example, becomes the head of his village's political party he is likely to become the middleman between many villagers and the resources controlled by higher party officials. In this case he may have clients for whom he also serves as broker. The diffuse claims of the patron-client tie actually make it normal for the patron to act as a broker for his clients when they must deal with powerful third parties-much as the patron saint in folk Catholicism who directly helps his devotees while also acting as their broker with the Lord.23 If on the other hand, the political party simply gives the local patron direct control of its programs and grants in the area, it thereby enhances his resources for becoming a paton on a larger scale and eliminates the need for brokerage.
Patrons ought finally to be differentated from other partly related terms for leadership such as "boss," "caudillo,' or "cacique." ?C9BSS1 is a designation at once vague and richly connotative. Although a boss may often function as a patron, the terma itself implies (a) that he is the most powerful man in the arena and (b) that his power rests more on the inducements and sanctions at his disposal than on affection or status. As distinct from a patron who may or may not be the supreme local leader and whose leadership rests at least partly on rank and affection, the boss is a secular leader par excellence who depends almost entirely on palpable inducements and threats to move people. As we shall show later, a settled agrarian environment with a recognized status hierarchy is a typical setting for leadership by patrons, while a more mobile, egalitarian environment is a typical setEng for the rise of bosses. The final two terms, "caudillo" and "cacique" are most commonly used in Latin America to designate the regional -often rural-bosses. Again the implication is that coercion is a main pillar of power, and in the case of the caudillo, a personal following is 2X And it naturally follows that in underdeveloped tries, where the patrimonial view of office is especially strong, a public post could be a clientcreang resource. 
Vol. 66 doctor, literates, local military chief, teacherreligious or secular. Those equipped with these skills control scarce resources than can enhance the social status, health, or material well being of another. Inasmuch as such resources rest on knowledge, they are less perishable than more material sources-although the time of the expert is limited-and can be used again and again without being diminished. Such resources are relatively, but not entirely, secure. In the case of lawyers and literati, for example, the exchange price of their services depends respectively on the continued existence of a court system and the veneration of a particular literary tradition, both of which are subject to change. The value of a local military chief's protection is similarly vulnerable to devaluation once the nation state has established local law and order.
Reliance on direct control of real property is a second common means of building a clientele. Traditionally, the typical patron controlled scarce land. Those he permitted to farm it as sharecroppers or tenants became permanently obligated to him for providing the means of their subsistence. Any businessman is in a similar position; as the owner of a tobacco factory, a rice mill, or a small store he is able to obligate many of those of lower status whom he employs, to whom he extends credit, or with whom he does business. This kind of resource, in general, is more perishable than personal skills. A landlord has only so many arable acres, a businessman only so many jobs, a shopkeeper so much ready cash, and each must carefully invest those resources to bring the maximum return. Like any real property, moreover, private real property is subject to seizure or restrictions on its use.
A third resource base available to the potential patron is what might be called indirect, office-based property. Here we refer to patrons who build a clientele on the strength of their freedom to dispense rewards placed in their trust by some third party (parties). A village headman who uses his authority over the distribution of communal land to the poor or the distribution of corvee labor and taxation burdens in order to extend his personal clientele would be a typical example of traditional officebased patronship. One can classify similarly office-holders in colonial or contemporary settings whose discretionary powers over employment, promotion, assistance, welfare, licensing, permits, and other scarce values can serve as the basis of a network of personally obligated followers. Politicians and administrators who exploit their office in this way to reward clients while violating the formal norms of public conduct are, of course, acting corruptly. Finally, we should add private-sector office-holders in the private sector such as plantation managers, purchasing agents, and hiring bosses, who may also use their discretionary authority to nurture a clientele. Indirect, office-based property is least secure in many respects, as its availability depends on continuity in a position that is ultimately given or withdrawn by third parties. A landlord will usually retain his local base whereas an officeholder is likely to be swept out by a new victor at the polls or simply by a power struggle within the ruling group. In spite of the risks involved, these posts are attractive because the resources connected with many of them are far greater than those which an individual can amass directly.
The categories of resources just discussed are not mutually exclusive. It is common, for example, for a patron to have a client who is obligated to him by being a tenant on his land and also by having secured an agricultural loan through his patron's chairmanship of the ruling party's local branch. The resources that cement a dyadic tie may thus be multiple-it is often a question of deciding which is the predominant resource. Much the same analysis can be made of a patron-client cluster or network, since a patron may have clients who are bound to him by quite different resources, and it is often important to determine what the main resource is that holds the cluster together.
Resource Base of Clientage. As the other member of a reciprocating pair, the client is called upon to provide assistance and services when the patron requires them. The variation in the nature of such assistance is another means of distinguishing one patron-client dyad from another. Here one might want to differentiate: (1) labor sevices and economic support, as provided by a rent-paying tenant or employee, (2) military or fighting duties, such as those performed by members of a bandit group for their chief, and (3) political services such as canvassing or otherwise acting as an agent of a politician. Within the "political service" category one may wish to separate electoral services from nonelectoral political help. I should add here that the term "clients" can refer to those who are in the middle of a patron-client pyramid-being a client to someone higher up. and a patron to those below. In this case, a superior patron will be interested in his client's potential services, but those services will include the size, skills, assets, and status of the client's own subordinate following.
Just as a patron-client dyad can be distinguished by the main resource base of clientage so can a patron-client cluster be categorized by the modal pattern of client services for the cluster or pyramid as a whole.
Balance of Affective and Instrumental Ties. By definition, instrumental ties play a major role in the patron-client dyad. It is nonetheless possible to classify such dyads by the extent to which affective bonds are also involved in the relationship. At one end of this continuum one might place patron-client bonds which, in addition to their instrumental character, are reinforced by affective links growing, say, from the patron and the client having been schoolmates, coming from the same village, being distant relatives, or simply from mutual love. Comparable affective rewards may also spring from the exchange of deference on the one hand and noblesse oblige on the other in a settled agrarian status network-rewards that have value beyond the material exchanges they often involve. At the other end of the spectrum lies a dyadic tie much closer to an almost neutral exchange of goods and services. The more purely coercive the relationship is and the less traditional legitimacy it has, the more likely that affective bonds will be minimal.
This distinction has obvious analytical value. If we were to look at a patron's entire following, we would be able to classify each vertical bond acrording to the ratio of affective to instrumental rewards involved. (one could, of course, do the same for horizontal alliances. Using this criterion we could identify a set of followers among whom the ratio of affective to instrumental ties was relatively high, reflecting perhaps distant kinship, old village or neighborhood ties, or comparable bonds. The loyalty of this set of followers would be less dependent upon a continued flow of material benefits, simply because their loyalty is partly based on nonmaterial exchanges. As we move beyond this partly affective following to a patron's other supporters, the weight of instrumental, usually material, ties becomes relatively more important. The nature of a man's following-the balance of affective to instrumental ties obligating his clients to him-can tell us something about its stability under different conditions. When a patron increases his material resource base, it is his instrumental following that will tend to 29 There is no contradiction, I believe, in holding that a patron-client link originates in a power relationship and also holding that genuine affective ties reinforce that link. Affective ties often help legitimate a relationship that is rooted in inequality. For an argument that, in contrast, begins with the assumption that some cultures engender a psychological need for dependence, see Dominique 0. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (New York: Praeger, 1964). grow rapidly, and when he is in decline, that same following will shrink rapidly, as clients look for a more promising leader. The degree of dependence on material incentives within a following is, in principle, a quality one could measure by establishing how much more than their present material rewards a rival patron would have to offer to detach a given number of another's clients.
The affective-instrumental distinction just made leads to a similar, but not identical, distinction between the core and periphery of a man's following. These categories actually are distributed along a continuum; at the periphery of a man's following are those clients who are relatively easy to detach while at the core are followers who are more firmly bound to him. The periphery is composed of clients bound largely by instrumental rewards, while the core is composed of clients linked by strong affective ties, as well as clients who are attracted to a patron by such strong instrumental ties that they seem unbreakable.30 This amounts, in effect, to a distinction between a man's virtually irreducible following and his more or less fluctuating, "fair-weather" following. Patrons can then be differentiated by the size of their corefollowing relative to their peripheral-following. A landlord or a businessman will generally have a sizable core group composed both of his friends, kin, etc., and of his tenants or employees. This nucleus is his initial following; his clientele may grow larger, but it is unlikely to contract further than this durable core. A politician or bureaucrat, on the other hand, unless he is privately wealthy, is likely to have a comparatively smaller core group composed mostly of those with whom he has strong affective ties and, hence, a relatively large proportion of "fair-weather" clients. The blows of fortune such a politician or administrator suffers are more likely to be instantly and fully reflected in a reduction of the size of his clientele, which is largely a calculating one. Politicians, and bureaucrats, because they have smaller core followings and because they can, through their office, often tap vast resources, are apt to have meteoric qualities as patrons; the landholder, by contrast, is likely to cast a steadier, if dimmer, light.
Balance of Voluntarism and Coercion. There are obvious and important differences in the degree of coercion involved in a patron-client bond. At one end are the clients with virtually no choice but to follow the patron who directly : F. G. Bailey uses the terms "core" and "support" in much the same fashion: see his "Parapolitical Systems," in Swartz, ed., Local-Level Politics, pp. 281-
294.
The American Political Science Review Vol. 66 controls their means of subsistence. Here one might place a tenant whose landlord provides his physical security, his land, his implements and seed, in a society where land is scarce and insecurity rife. Nearer the middle of this continuum would perhaps be the bonds between independent smallholders who depend on a landlord for the milling and marketing of their crops, for small loans, and for assistance with the police and administration. Such bonds are still based on inequality, but the client, because he has some bargaining power, is not simply putty in his patron's hands. Finally, let us assume that an electoral system has given clients a new resource and has spurred competition among patrons for followings that can swing the election to them. In this case the inequality in bargaining power is further reduced, and the client emerges as more nearly an independent political actor whose demands will receive a full hearing from his patron. In general, the oppression of the client is greater when the patron's services are vital, when he exercises a monopoly over their distribution, and when he has little need for clients himself. The freedom of the client is enhanced most when there are many patrons whose services are not vital and who compete with one another to assemble a large clientele-say for electoral purposes.
The greater the coercive power of the patron vis-a-vis his client, the fewer rewards he must supply to retain him. A patron in a strong position is more likely to employ sanctions-threats to punish the client or to withdraw benefits he currently enjoys-whereas a relatively weaker patron is more likely to offer inducementspromises to reward a client with benefits he does not now enjoyA' In each instance, superior control over resources is used to gain the compliance of followers, but the use of sanctions indicates a higher order of power than the use of inducements.
Assessment of the coercive balance and of the ratio of sanctions to inducements can be made not only for a dyad but also for a patronclient cluster or pyramid. The cluster of a local baron with a private army may be held intact by a mix of deference and. sanctions, while a campaigning politician may build a cluster simply with favors if he has no coercive power or traditional legitimacy. Each cluster or pyramid has its special vulnerability. The coercive cluster will be jeopardized by a breach of the patron's local power monopoly, and a cluster based on inducements will be in danger if its leader's income or access to public funds is cut off. Durability Over Time. Patron-client dyads may be rather ephemeral, or they may persist for long periods.32 In a traditional setting they are likely to last until one of the partners has died. Knowing how durable such ties are can also tell us something about the structure of competition over time. Where dyads are persistent they tend to produce persistent factional structures with some continuity in personnel over time, at least stable clusters or pyramids that may recombine in a variety of ways but are constructed from the same components. Where dyads are fragile, personal alignments may undergo an almost total reordering within a decade.
Since patron-client clusters are based ultimately on power relations, they will endure best in a stable setting that preserves existing power positions. A particular patron will thus retain his clients as long as he continues to dominate the supply of services they need. A patron is also likely to keep his followers if the scope of reciprocity that binds them is greater. That is, the more of the client's vital needs a patron can meet (i.e., if he can supply not only land and security but also influence with the administration, help in arranging mortgages or schooling, and so forth), the greater the tendency for the tie to be invoked frequently and to endure over long periods. Compared with patrons who can provide only legal services, only financial help, or only educational advantages, the multiplex bond between patron and client is a solid linkage that serves many needs; since it is more of a whole-person tie, it will be called into action often. acteristic of the area's contemporary politics as of its traditional politics. In one sense, the "style" of the patron-client link, regardless of its context, is distinctively traditional. It is particularistic where (following Parsons) modern links are universal; it is diffuse and informal where modern ties are specific or contractual; and it produces vertically-integrated groups with shifting interests rather than horizontally-integrated groups with durable interests. Despite their traditional style, however, patron-client clusters both serve as mechanisms for bringing together individuals who are not kinsmen and as the building-blocks for elaborate networks of vertical integration. They cannot, therefore, be merely dismissed as vestigial remains of archaic structures but must be analyzed as a type of social bond that may be dominant in some contexts and marginal in others.
Homogeneity of
In my view, most of traditional and contemporary Southeast Asia has met three necessary conditions for the continued vitality of patronclient structures: (1) the persistence of marked inequalities in the control of wealth, status, and power which have been accepted (until recently) as more or less legitimate; (2) the relax tive absence of firm, impersonal guarantees of physical security, status and position, or wealth, and (3) the inability of the kinship unit to serve as an effective vehicle for personal security or advancement.
The first condition is more or less self-evident. A client affiliates with a patron by virtue of the patron's superior access to important goods and services. This inequality is an expression of a stratification system which serves as the basis for vertical exchange. Classically in Southeast Asia, the patron has depended more on the local organization of force and access to office as the sinews of his leadership than upon hereditary status or land ownership. Inequalities were thus marked, but elite circulation tended to be comparatively high. With the penetration of colonial government and commercialization of the economy, land ownership made its appearance (especially in the Philippines and Vietnam) as a major basis of patronage. At the same time access to colonial office replaced to some extent victory in the previously more fluid local power contests as the criterion for local patronage. Although land ownership and bureaucratic office have remained two significant bases of patronship in postcolonial Southeast Asia, they have been joinedand sometimes eclipsed as patronage resources -by office in political parties or military rank.
If inequities in access to vital goods were alone sufficient to promote the expansion of pa- In such an environment, where subsistence needs are paramount and physical security uncertain, a modicum of protection and insurance can often be gained only by depending on a superior who undertakes personally to provide for his own clients. Operating with such a slim margin, the client prefers to minimize his losses-at the cost of his independence-rather than to maximize his gains by taking risks he cannot afford. When one's physical security and means of livelihood are problematic, and when recourse to law is unavailable or unreliable, the social value of a personal defender is maximized.
The growth of strong, institutional orders that reduce the need for personal alliances was a rare occurrence-the Roman and Chinese imperial orders being the most notable exceptions-until the 19th and 20th centuries, when modem nation-states developed the technical means to impose their will throughout their territory. Before that, however, the existence of a fair degree of local autonomy was inevitable, given the limited power available to most traditional kingdoms. The greater that autonomy, or what might be called the localization of power, the more decisive patron-client linkages were likely to be. In settings as diverse as much of Latin America, feudal Europe, and precolonial Southeast Asia, the localization of power was pervasive and gave rise to networks of patronclient bonds. From time to time in Southeast Asia a centralizing kingdom managed to extend its power over wide areas, but seldom for very long or with a uniform system of authority. A typical Southeast Asian kingdom's authority weakened steadily with increasing distance from the capital city. Beyond the immediate environs of the court, the ruler was normally reduced to choosing which of a number of competing petty chiefs with local power bases he would prefer to back.A7 Such chiefs retained their own personal following; their relationship to the ruler was one of bargaining as well as deference; and they might back a rival claimant to the throne or simply defy demands of the court when they were dissatisfied with their patron's behavior. Thus, the political structure of traditional Southeast Asia favored the growth of patron-client links, inasmuch as it was necessary for peasants to accommodate themselves to the continuing reality of autonomous personal authority at almost all levels.
The The third condition under which patronclient bonds remain prominent relates directly to the capacity of such ties to foster cooperation among nonkin. As a mechanism for protection or for advancement, patron-client dyads will flourish when kinship bonds alone become inadequate for these purposes.
Although kinship bonds are seldom completely adequate as structures of protection and advancement even in the simplest societies, they may perform these functions well enough to minimize the need for nonkin structures. Such is the case among small isolated bands of hunters and gatherers, among self-sufficient, corporate lineages and within corporate villages."" None of these conditions, however, is particularly applicable to Southeast Asian societies. The highland areas are inhabited by poorly integrated minorities but only rarely are these minorities so isolated as to lack economic and political ties with the larger society. clients to an outside patron and thereby have established a working alliance against a third patron in the same communal group who is linked to a different outside leader. Here, the communal group is rent by factionalism and has multiple ties to the outside world.43 The vertical links outside the communal group, however, are likely to be somewhat weaker or more tentative than links within the community. This is so because all competing subordinate patrons and their clientele fall within a communal unit which shares a potentially strong interest; if the communal group as a whole were threatened, the shared parochial links would serve as the basis for a unity that might supersede any exterior patron-client links. The situation described in Figure B is only likely to arise, then, if there are no salient 43A combination of situations one and two would occur when the tacit rules within a communal group allowed patron-client conflict but forbade the losing or weaker patrons within the communal group from maintaining ties to outside leaders.
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Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia 105 collective threats to the communal group as a whole. The mixture of communalism and patronclient structures portrayed in Figures A and B focuses on the extracommunal patron-client links that achieve a measure, however weak, of intercommunal integration. A third mixture of communal and dyadic association focuses instead on intracommunal politics alone. This would be represented by just the boxed portion of Figure B , which indicates that, even if communal conflict is widespread, it may well be that the intracommunal politics of each contending group is best described by the patronclient model.
The salience of communal feeling, especially in Malaysia, Burma, and Laos, but also in Indonesia and Vietnam makes such mixtures of communalism and patron-client politics common. Except at the apex of the political structure where a leader may have leaders of smaller communal groups as his clients, most patrons have followings that are almost exclusively drawn from their own community. Intercommunal integration tends to take place near the apex of the political structure with the base of each communal pyramid remaining largely separate. The links that represent this integration tend, moreover, to be fragile and to disintegrate in the face of a communitywide threat. Both communalism and patron-client links share the political stage, but patron-client structures are most prominent in periods of peace and stability. In addition, the process of politics within each communal group-in effect holding communal affiliation constant-is usually best analyzed along patron-client lines. In nations such as Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia, which are comparatively homogeneous culturally, there are few communal barriers to the proliferation of patron-client linkages. Thus, the patron-client model can be applied to those nations in its "pure" form since communal affiliation is not important in creating discontinuous patron-client networks.
B. The Transformation of Traditional
Patron-Client Ties 1. The General Trend. The typical patron in traditional Southeast Asia was a petty local leader. Unlike the representative of a corporate kin group or a corporate village structure (rare outside Vietnam and Java, respectively), the local patron owed his local leadership to his personal skills, his wealth, and occasionally to his connections with regional leaders-all of which enhanced his capacity to build a personal following. The fortunes of such petty leaders waxed or waned depending on the continuing availability of resources and spoils which served to knit together a following. Perhaps the most striking feature of local patron leadership in Southeast Asia was its fluidity and instability, which contributed to a relatively high rate of local elite circulation. In contrast to India, where hereditary office-holding and landholding provided somewhat greater continuity, the typical local leader in Southeast Asia had put together many of the necessary resources of wealth, force, connections, and status on his own and could probably only promise his son a slight advantage in the next round. The capacity to mobilize an armed following was particularly valuable in the precolonial era; access to colonial office was a surer basis of patronage than armed force in the colonial period; and the ability to win electoral contests often became the central resource with the advent of independence. Not only have resource bases proved mercurial over time, but the nature of patron-client ties in the indirectly ruled highland areas has remained substantially different from lowland patterns. Amidst this variety and change, it is nevertheless possible to discern a number of secular trends in the character of patron-client bonds. Such trends are far more pronounced in some areas than others, but they do represent directions of change that are important for our analysis.
(1) In comparison with more bureaucratic empires, patron-client bonds in precolonial Southeast Asia were not, as I have pointed out, markedly persistent With the quickening of social change brought about by the commercialization of the economy and the penetration of the colonial state into local affairs, however, a patron's resource base became even more vulnerable to the actions of outside forces over which he had little or no control. It was an ingenious patron indeed who could survive the creation of the colonial state, the export boom, the depression of the 1930s, the Japanese occupation, and independence with his resources and clientele intact. The major exception to this trend was the colonial period in indirectly ruled areas where colonial military and financial backing of traditional rulers, if anything, brought a stability-or stagnation-to political systems that had been more chaotic. Elsewhere, patron-client links tended to become more fragile and less persistent.
(2) With the differentiation of the economy and its effects on the social structure, the scope of exchange between patron and client tended to narrow somewhat. Where traditional patrons could generally serve as all purpose protectors, the newer patron's effectiveness tended to be more specialized in areas such as political influence, modern sector employment, or administrative influence. Although patron-client ties remained flexible and personal, the more limited capacities of the patron tended to make relationships less comprehensive and hence less stable.4-(3) The traditional patron for the most part operated with personally controlled local resources. One effect of the colonial period-and independence as well-was to increase radically the importance of external resources for local patronage. A following based on purely local office or landholding was seldom sufficient to sustain a patron in a new environment where schools, agricultural services, regional banks, and public employment represented competing sources of patronage. The growing role of outside resources, in most cases, thus led to competition among patrons, each of whom recruited followings with the particular resources at his command.46 In addition, since those who controlled the new resources were generally office-holders subject to transfers or political changes at the center, the new patrons were less secure than older patrons and probably more inclined to maximize their gains over the short run.
(4) Because the new patron-client ties were weaker and less comprehensive, and because the new patrons were often from outside the local community, the instrumental nature of the exchange became more prominent. A relationship that had always involved some calculations of advantage lost some of its traditional legitimacy and grew more profane. Patronclient exchanges became more monetized, calculations more explicit, and concern centered "Again, indirectly ruled areas were often exceptions in that local rulers tended to take on new powers under the colonial regime and thus became more comprehensive patrons than in the past. more on the rate of return from the relationship rather than on its durability. This trend meant that newer patron-client clusters were likely to have a comparatively large "fairweather" periphery, a comparatively small corefollowing, and a less "constant" patron as well.
(5) The breakdown of local patron monopolies follows logically from most of the changes we have already discussed. Where one local landowner or traditional leader had once dominated he now faced competitors who might be local administrators of state welfare in loan programs, teachers in new secular schools, a local trader or businessman, or the resident manager of a foreign-owned plantation. Factional strife which reflects this competition was most common in villages where socioeconomic change and government penetration had been far-reaching, and less common in more traditional areas.47 (6) As differentiation occurred within the local societies, they gave rise to patron-client clusters that were distinct. A bureaucrat might have a following primarily within his agency, a businessman among his laborers, and a landowner among his tenants. This process of differentiation among clusters provided the potential basis for durable group interests inasmuch as many clusters now had an institutional distinctiveness.
(7) While the changes we have examined may have assisted the vertical integration of patron-client pyramids, they tended to reduce the universality of coverage. That is, more and more people in the new market towns and cities, on plantations, and on small plots they rented from absentee landlords were no longer attached-or were very weakly attached-to patrons. These new elements of the population varied greatly in their interests and their levels of organization, but, in any event, they fell outside the older patron-client network. While some long run trends in patron-client ties seem clear, it is difficult to say anything about the balance between voluntarism and coercion over time. On the one hand, changes in the economy have made clients less autonomous and more dependent on patrons for protection against a fall in world prices, for cash advances before the harvest, and so forth. Also contributing to a decline in the client's bargaining position is the imported legal system of property guarantees which allow a wealthy man, if he so chooses, to resist pressures for redistribution that operated in a traditional setting. On the other hand, the breakdown of local patronly monopolies and the exchange resources that electoral systems often place in the hands of clients work in the opposite direction. Given these contradictory tendencies, one can draw the tentative conclusion that patron coerciveness has declined only where extralocal resources and competitive elections are common and has elsewhere either increased or remained the same.
In general, patron-client ties have tended to become more instrumental, less comprehensive, and hence less resilient. They still represent diffuse personal bonds of affection when compared to the impersonal, contractual ties of the marketplace, but the direction of change is eroding their more traditional characteristics. Even this supple traditional protective mechanism has had to pay a certain price to survive in the midst of a nation-state with a commercialized economy. The durability and legitimacy of the patron-client tie was best served when all of a client's dependencies were focused on a single patron. But, as Godfrey and Monica Wilson have shown, this situation is less and less likely since the process of modernization tends to create multiple dependencieseach of less intensitya-"rather than concentrating dependence on one person.48 The slowly weakening comprehensiveness of the link is, ultimately, what undermines its sanctity and legitimacy for the client. 
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The American Political Science Review Vol. 66 ularly after independence it "nationalized" access to patronly resources, thus creating new bases of patronage and devaluating old ones. Traditional peasant societies, operating in an economy of great scarcity in which one family's gain is another's loss, have generally developed a variety of social control mechanisms that guarantee a measure of security to each family and temper the centrifugal forces generated by the struggle for subsistence.49 These mechanisms commonly involve forcing anyone who has accumulated considerable wealth to redistribute a portion of it. A wealthy man is pressed to assume expensive ceremonial offices, to make large religious contributions, to give loans and donations, and so forth. He trades his wealth for prestige, and, by so providing for at least the minimum well-being of others, he becomes a legitimate patron with a personal entourage of those obligated to him.
The central fact about these redistributive mechanisms, however, is that they operate by virtue of a local power situation. That is, the wealthy man in a peasant village can seldom rely on outside force or law to protect him; instead, his wealth and position are ultimately validated by the legitimacy he acquires in the local community. Unless a wealthy individual can persuade most of the community that his wealth is no threat to them or can win enough personal allies to sustain his position, he is in danger. Colonialism, however, broke the relative autonomy of the local arena and hence weakened many of the community's redistributive pressures. Supported in effect by the power of the colonial regime to enforce its notion of law, the patron could increasingly ignore local levelling pressures. If he lost much of the social approval he previously enjoyed, he had gained an outside ally with the power to guarantee his local position. The colonial power situation thus offered the older patron new leverage in the local arena-leverage which was further strengthened by the growing complexity of colonial society. As Blau has explained, Social approval has a less pervasive significance as a restraining force in complex societies than in simpler ones, because the multiplicity of groups Absentee landlords, the new urban wealthy, and minority communities (who were relatively impervious to local social approval so long as they had colonial backing) were new elements in colonial society which could escape patronly obligations. The colonial system thus tended to allow existing patrons greater latitude for exploitation while producing a class of wealthy nonpatrons.
If the intrusion of external power could strengthen the hand of an existing patron, it could also create a resource base for the rise of new patrons. The activities of the colonial regime included the hiring, firing, and promotion of public employees, the dispensing of contracts, and the granting of licenses and permits, all of which could be used to create a personal following. With independence, not only did local leaders take over responsibility for all these decisions, but the scope of government activity and regulation was generally expanded into new areas such as community development. The survival or demise of a local patron often depended, as Geertz has shown, on how successful he was in tapping these new bases of power.5' Except for the rare local patrons-especially in indirectly ruled areas-who were able to monopolize these external resources, the new situation produced more competition and mobility among patrons. Many potential clients quickly discovered that their needs were best served by a patron who had access to the institutions which controlled the use of these external resources. In any local context this shift could be measured by the rise of new patrons who were wholly or partly based in these new structures. Most of the transformations in patron-client bonds that we have been discussing apply with greatest force to the directly ruled, lowland areas of Southeast Asia where the colonial impact was both swift and far-reaching, and where colonial officials more thoroughly replaced indigenous leaders. In the indirectly ruled areas-such as highland Burma, the Unfederated States of Malaya, most of Indonesia's Outer Islands, Cambodia, Laos (and perhaps Thailand belongs here as a limiting case of indirect colonial influence) -these generalizations must be qualified. To ease the financial and administrative burden of colonial rule in these areas, the colonizers generally kept local rulers in place and used them as agents. Since these were by and large peripheral areas of marginal commercial interest, the pace of economic change tended to be slower as well.
The effects of this policy on patrons, in contrast to the directly ruled regions, were twofold. First, local patron/leaders tended to be strengthened by colonial backing and the new powers given to them. What had probably been a fairly unstable and minimal chieftaincy now became a local regime stabilized and extended by the colonial power. Secondly, the sanction of colonial authority permitted many such leaders to broaden the resource base of their authority.53 It is true of course that a local patron's new source of strength entailed some threat to his legitimacy, but since the colonial regime demanded little beyond the maintenance of law and order in those areas, it was seldom crippling. On the other hand, the annointed patron now had the means to eclipse his rival patrons. He not only had his traditional authority and the discretionary administrative powers given him by the colonial regime, but he could use his power to purchase land, control local trade, and act as the commissioned agent of private firms. Frequently, then, the local ruler gained a new lease on political life as the dominant local figure owing to his wealth, his administrative power, and a measure of tradi- The nature of the new exchange relationship that gives vitality to this patron-client pyramid is similar in most electoral systems. The local patrons and their clients provide votes at election time, hopefully carrying the village, while the party undertakes to help its local adherents (through their patron) with jobs, help in dealing with the bureaucracy, providing public works, and so forth. Since the winning party can generally offer more support to local allies than the opposition can, local patrons are likely to display a "bandwagon effect," switching allegiance to a probable winner. In addition, the party's need for a powerful local base is likely to lead to a certain localization of power. In return for delivering local votes for its list, the party is likely to give its local patron a wide discretion in administrative and development decisions affecting the locality. Thus many local patrons are able to entrench themselves further as dominant figures.
A third consequence of elections for the patron-client structure is to promote the expansion of patron-client ties and the politicization of existing bonds. Knowing that an electoral victory is important, a local patron with a modest following will probably try to obligate more clients to him in order to strengthen his electoral position. Patrons who have previously been politically inactive would "immediately convert their private power such as control over sharecroppers, debtors kinsmen, neighbors, etc., into public political power in the form of votes."58 Given these tendencies, the patron-client structures in a given community are most evident immediately before an election, especially a hotly contested one, when the contestants attempt to activate any links that might advance their cause.
A final point about the impact of elections on patron-client structures is that they tend to heighten factionalism and unless one cohesive party completely dominates, to promote the survival of local opposition factions. In most traditional settings, patron rivalry was largely limited to the local arena so as not to invite external intervention. An electoral system, by contrast, creates rival national or regional parties which need allies at the local level. A weak faction that might previously have been forced to compose its differences with a dominant faction, can now appeal for external support. Many of these external allies are able to provide their local adherents with patronage, cash, 
